



Compensation for Victims of Disasters. A Comparative
Law and Economic Perspective
Citation for published version (APA):
He, Q., & Faure, M. G. (2021). Compensation for Victims of Disasters. A Comparative Law and Economic
Perspective. European Journal of Law Reform, 23(2), 222-241.
https://doi.org/10.5553/EJLR/138723702021023002004





Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Document license:
Taverne
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.




Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 02 Nov. 2021
8/13/2021 Compensation for Victims of Disasters · European Journal of Law Reform · Eleven Journals
https://www.elevenjournals.com/tijdschrift/ejlr/2021/2/EJLR_1387-2370_2021_023_002_004 1/18
DOI: 10.5553/EJLR/138723702021023002004
Compensation for Victims of Disasters
A Comparative Law and Economic Perspective
Qihao He en Michael Faure
Suggested citation 
Qihao He and Michael Faure, 'Compensation for Victims of Disasters', (2021) European Journal of
Law Reform 222-241
A Introduction
The international community is facing many challenges under extreme conditions. Taking
a look at the archives of the Minerva Center for the Rule of Law under Extreme
Conditions, it shows the increasing frequency and severity of a broad range of disasters.
For example, just in the past year (2018), over 800 people had been confirmed killed by a
deadly 7.5-magnitude earthquake and tsunami in eastern Indonesia; and a large-scale
flooding caused by Hurricane Florence hit Cape Verde and Bermuda, and the United
States badly.  Such disaster stories are repeated and updated in the archives day after
day. Given the prediction that disasters will become more frequent, more intense and
more costly in the future,  there is an urgent need for the international community to
engage in disaster risk management and to facilitate public and private mechanisms to
compensate victims. 
Disaster management and compensation are central on the current public and political
agendas. The 2001 9/11 terrorism attack and the 2005 Hurricane Katrina in the United
States,  the 2002 Elbe flood in Europe  and the 2008 Great Sichuan Earthquake in
China  are typical events nurturing the active political discourse. To respond to the
question whether and how it is feasible to compensate disaster victims and to control the
costs of such disasters, the legal system could play an important role in governing a broad
range of disasters in the rule of law societies.  
In general, in the law and economics literature, four types of legislative reactions to
disasters are distinguished.  The first one is where many governments do nothing
structurally, but the victims generally rely on liability rules of tort law and social security
already in place. The second one is government ad hoc charity or funds with fiscal
allocation paid by the taxpayer’s money. The third one is the insurance coverage (usually
first-party insurance) for victims. The last one is a public-private partnership (‘PPP’),
whereby the government facilitates private insurance and/or acts as reinsurer to support
private insurance. 
These solutions are quite diverging, and differ among many different legal regimes. For
example, France introduced insurance for disaster coverage in 1982, whilst a government
disaster fund still exists in Austria. Based on the current discussion in the law and
economic literature, this article tries to explore the optimal compensation mechanism
from a timing framework. Corresponding to a repetitive circle of disaster management as
prevention – response – recovery,  we assess the ex ante (before the disaster occurs),
during (emergency response during a disaster) and ex post (after the disaster)
compensation mechanisms. 
Ex ante is often regarded as the best way of victim protection and compensation, since it
could reduce the damages caused by disasters and may even make compensation
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insurance transforms ex post liability and damages into ex ante costs (premiums),  and
could contribute to disaster prevention and mitigation through, e.g. providing incentives
for potential victims to escape from risk exposure.  
During efforts are carried out when a state of emergency is declared. Emergency relief is
popular practice as during mechanism. It is often supplied by the government in the
immediate aftermath of a disaster, such as providing shelter, food, medical assistance and
direct payment to victims.  This type of government intervention has a legitimate
justification due to its public good nature, and few private parties have incentives to take
such measures.  
Ex post happens after the state of emergency is over, and its goal is to compensate victims’
personal and property damages and return the conditions to those had the disaster never
occurred.  A government fund and recovery programme (also called charity by
government) is a well-known ex post mechanism for disaster victims. Besides these
government-provided compensation programmes, the liability rule of tort law is also
considered as an incentive-based ex post mechanism.  However, liability rules can
basically only apply in cases of technological disasters where a liable tortfeasor can be
identified.  Where no tortfeasor is at hand in the case of natural disasters, victims often
turn to government for compensation eventually. Correspondingly, politicians often
participate in a race to provide ex post funds and recovery due to huge political benefits.  
According to the law and economic literature, government compensation is criticized for
leading to an oversupply ex post and undersupply (investments in prevention) ex ante.
There is a developing consensus that under particular conditions, ex ante insurance is a
preferred compensation mechanism,  and ex post compensation could be substituted by
less costly ex ante measures.  Most of the preventive measures aiming at disaster risk
reduction can obviously be taken by the government. The government can, e.g. build dikes
and organize a system of levies in view of an effective water management after a
hurricane. But potential victims can also take preventive measures. They can, first of all,
take a siting decision in an area which is not prone to flooding; and within the dwellings,
measures can be taken, e.g. to put electrical equipment and valuables in the attic, rather
than in the cellar. Since the government intervention can be divided between the during
efforts and the ex post efforts, government efforts should, in fact, focus on both.
Emergency relief by the government has advantages as that relief has a public good
character and will usually not be provided by individuals. In addition, the government can
support private ex ante insurance by acting as reinsurer of last resort, thus facilitating
private disaster insurance. 
Following a comparative law and economic perspective, where the idea is to search for
victim compensation at the lowest cost and at the same time provide incentives for
disaster risk reduction,  our analysis indicates how a (combined) form of compensation
mechanism could supply efficient incentives for prevention and mitigation  and be
provided at the lowest costs and thus realize welfare maximization. The remainder of this
article is set up as follows. After this introduction (Section A), Section B describes the
evolution of our understanding on disasters and introduces principles of fair and efficient
compensation. Section C explains why the government intervenes in disaster
compensation and how it can intervene fairly and efficiently. A distinction is drawn
between the during efforts (emergency relief) and ex post efforts (ad hoc recovery and
fund). Section D argues that where the government cannot provide efficient compensation
ex post, insurance may do so ex ante. Then, in the next Section (Section E), as an optimal
approach, the structure and the role of the PPP are discussed. These discussions include
whether government intervention is needed to facilitate insurance work adequately, and
what is the role for both the government and private insurance. Section F brings the
article to a close with a few concluding remarks.
B Understanding Disasters and the Principles of Victim Compensation
I The Understanding on Disasters
Before discussing how to manage disaster risk and how to compensate victims, it is
necessary to address the question what a disaster is, since which mechanism will be the
optimal depends to some extent on the nature of the disaster.  
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and believes the cause of disaster is neither God nor nature (at least not alone).  Two
sub-conceptions ‘risk’ and ‘vulnerability’ are tied to the understanding of disaster as an
act of the social.  The question how to address disaster then becomes how to control the
risk and reduce the vulnerability to disasters. Victims of disasters no longer accept the old
adagium (proverb) ‘the law lies where it falls’, but argue the social system’s inability to
manage disasters. According to the paradigm theory,  our understanding of disasters
evolved from the first disaster-paradigm ‘acts of God’, to the second ‘acts of nature’, and
to the current ‘acts of the social (humankind)’.  
A common distinction of disasters is made among natural disasters (e.g. earthquakes,
floods and tsunamis), man-made disasters (e.g. wars, terrorism and explosions) and
socioeconomic disasters (e.g. financial crisis and severe sociopolitical fragmentation).
However, such distinctions become less important since there are ‘many causes but one
clear truth: disasters are not natural’.  Whilst the causes of disasters may be natural,
their outcome, or at least the severity of that outcome, are not necessarily so. Under this
circumstance, it is reasonable to predict that victims will claim compensation, especially
when the harm is large and hits thousands of victims. Some politicians will not be able to
resist the temptation of compensating the victims, due to the large political rewards that
compensation provides.
II Guiding Principles of Compensation
Since there are different types of mechanism to compensate disaster victims, how to
assess, evaluate and compare these mechanisms is a core issue. The literature provides
valuable insights to develop a few guiding principles. 
The first principle is that a victim compensation programme should accord with efficiency
standards. These efficiency standards include, inter alia, the following: first, the
compensation mechanism should provide potential victims with incentives to prevent
damages and reduce losses since prevention is always more important than cure.
Second, the compensation mechanism should apply disaster risk differentiation, which
prevents shifting of risks and losses from a collectivity, and make those who contribute
larger to the risk pay more.  Risk differentiation relates, in the first place, to tortfeasors
(e.g. an operator of a nuclear facility) who expose individuals and society at risk. But risk
differentiation can also apply to the victims and their respective vulnerability to the
disaster. If a compensation programme (e.g. for flooding) applies risk differentiation, it
will provide incentives for prevention, risk reduction and mitigation of damage.  Third,
the compensation mechanism should be operated at the lowest administrative cost.
Fourth, the compensation programme should ensure timely payments to victims since the
delays in paying can increase the suffering of victims.  
Of course, there may be conflicts in trying to achieve this efficiency principle, especially in
cases where it would be impossible for potential victims to invest in disaster risk
reduction. For example, potential victims of flooding in Bangladesh could hardly be
blamed for living in a flood-prone area, as they may simply have no other choice in
practice.  In other cases, some low-income families may be seriously exposed to, e.g.
hurricane risks and would thus (in view of efficient risk differentiation) have to pay
relatively high insurance premiums which may be unaffordable to them. Some solutions
have been suggested, e.g. providing vouchers to low-income families to pay the insurance
premiums on the condition that they would take measures aiming at disaster risk
reduction.
C During and Ex Post Government-Provided Victim Compensation
Mechanisms
I Why Government Compensation for Victims?
Why government should consider compensating victims is a preliminary question that has
to be addressed before we discuss what kind of government mechanisms should be used.
It has been argued that many have the normative belief that providing disaster
compensation is one of the principal functions of government.  Disasters often lead to a
complete disruption of society. For example, as a result of a big nuclear blast or a
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homeless, and the banks have mortgages that are worth nothing anymore. The potential
side effects for the whole society (including the economy and financial system) can be
huge. Government compensation can fulfill an important function to bring victims back to
some extent of normality.  Moreover, leaving victims without relief and compensation is
incompatible with notions of solidarity, especially in the European Union (EU) welfare
states.  Third, government compensation for victims is providing public goods in case of
disasters. Disasters are different from an accident suffered by an individual victim.
Dealing with large-scale damage losses is a typical public good that is not sufficiently
provided through private actors. Compared with private actors, the government could
channel capital quickly after catastrophes since it can raise money by issuing debt or
government bonds, or tax (also a form of cross entire population risk diversification), or
diversifying the risks to future generations (a form of cross time diversification).  By
providing compensation to thousands of victims, it could help restore public trust in the
government.  
Although the significant losses and damages caused by disasters leading to serious
political and economic instability justify and require an efficient compensation system,
government compensation for victims of disasters is principally debated. Moreover,
questions also arise concerning the effectiveness of compensation in specific cases.
Generally, the government prefers to provide compensation ex post rather than ex ante
for political visibility due to news coverage.  Empirical research has shown that half of
all disaster compensation funding by the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) is driven by politics rather than by altruism.  That, therefore, raises the
question why particular victims, more particularly those suffering from disasters, should
receive a preferential treatment compared to others. This may violate the equality
principle. Kaplow suggested that what the government should worry about is the
incentives for disaster prevention and deterrence,  rather than redistributing taxpayers’
money to victims of disasters. 
This is why government compensation for disaster victims has a poor reputation, and is
generally criticized in the law and economic literature.  However, government
compensation mechanism takes different forms in different stages of disaster
management. We try to carve out a broader scope for government compensation and
make a distinction between during relief efforts (at time 0, meaning during the disaster
strikes and the immediate aftermath) and ex post recovery efforts (at time +1, meaning
the reasonable time after the disaster).  The general critics of government intervention
apply to ex post recovery, but not to the during relief efforts. The following sub-sections
expand the analysis of during versus ex post efforts and explore their fundamental
differences.
II During Government Relief
1. Pro
The during government relief has received less attention than traditionally ex post
recovery, which is in the law and economics literature often contrasted with ex ante
mechanisms.  During government relief refers to an immediate and effective response
after a disaster, and consists of medical assistance, food, money and other basic living
necessities.  In contrast to ex post recovery (at time +1), the during government relief
could be basically regarded as the emergency relief (at time 0). Like the ‘golden hour’ in
emergency medical services, there is also the so-called first 72 hours after a disaster.
The first 72 hours are critical, since, e.g. in the case of an earthquake, the chance of
finding survivors dramatically decreases after that period.  Therefore, there are strong
reasons for the during government relief. 
First, during government relief has a public good character since thousands of victims
need rapid compensation after the unannounced strikes. Since private actors may have no
incentives and lack the capacity to take emergency measures due to the large scale and the
suddenness of relief activities, the government may be the best placed to do so.  Second,
the government has the capacity to provide relief through the mobilization of national
coordinated efforts and the pooling of significant resources.  Third, relief is potentially
damage-limiting and has a positive ex post effect. It reduces the immediate damages that
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we discussed previously, the government prefers to oversupply recovery due to the news-
sensitive effect of disaster. The during relief could reduce recovery costs. It also alleviates,
to some extent, the dilution of ex ante prevention incentives since fewer funds will be
drawn to ex post recovery.  Although during relief is therefore generally preferred, at
least compared to ex post recovery, difficulties may remain in judging the effectiveness of
the during relief. The following case study concerning Hurricane Katrina can illustrate
that.
2. A Case Study of During Government Relief
Of course, there is sometimes also criticism on the way in which the government provides
during relief in particular cases. Relief is, in some cases, not provided in a timely manner
or not in an effective way. Take the example of the failure of FEMA’s performance during
Hurricane Katrina.  This is generally not considered the failure of government relief as
such, but rather an example of a failure concerning leadership with respect to government
relief.  The contrary example – the success of the Chinese Government during the 2008
Sichuan Earthquake has shown the positive role of during relief. 
In 2008, the earthquake, magnitude 8.0, struck the Sichuan Province in China. The losses
exceeded $ 100 billion and it caused 69,277 deaths.  The scale and suddenness of
disaster damages demand immense resources and funds in a short time. The central
government appropriated $ 83 million for relief efforts on the night that the earthquake
occurred; within one week, the central government supplied more than $ 400 million in
earthquake relief;  within four months, the government had created an emergency
disaster relief fund in the amount of about $ 11 billion.  
China’s during government relief efforts can be categorized into two aspects: (1)
emergency response, including rescuing victims, providing medical treatment to injured
people, providing food and shelter for victims, etc. and (2) direct payment to victims.
For per person, the government supplied a three-month temporary living subsidy, which
was approximately RMB 10 yuan (about US $ 2 in 2008) plus 0.5 kilogram of bread every
day to earthquake-affected people; for per family, government provided each victim’s
family with a lump sum payment of RMB 5,000 yuan (about US $ 900 in 2008).  The
government offered additional compensation to the injured, orphans, lonely elderly and
the handicapped with RMB 600 yuan (about US $ 100 in 2008) per month. Moreover, for
the seriously injured, the government provided RMB 28,000 (about US $ 4,600 in 2008)
medical subsidies; for the minor wounded, their medical treatment was free of charge
(paid by the government).  
According to three surveys conducted after the earthquake, during government relief has
been viewed as successful by the public.  It is regarded as both ‘close and timely’.  The
reasons why the during government relief was considered to be effective in China are the
following. First, the Chinese government has a relatively strong financial capability to
undertake disaster relief since China has grown to be the second largest economy in the
world.  Second, the Chinese central government could require some provinces which
have stronger economic power to donate 1% of their fiscal revenue from the preceding
year to assist disaster-affected areas.  This is a type of an intergovernmental national
‘pooling’ of the catastrophe risk. Third, the Chinese government could mobilize military
power for emergency disaster relief.  Fourth, the Chinese government enjoys high levels
of trust from residents in disaster areas since a lack of trust would undermine the
credibility and stability of the government relief, and lead to inefficiency, unrest, or even
failure.  Of course, one has to be relativistic about the fact that the public praises the
Chinese government for the effectiveness of the disaster relief. They were also largely the
beneficiaries of this during relief, so their opinion may be biased. However, generally
during relief does not create the same type of moral hazard as ex post recovery,  so the
most important question is whether the funds do indeed effectively reach the targeted
goals.
III Ex Post Government Recovery
Ex post government recovery often takes two different forms, either through ad hoc
charity or via a structural fund. These ex post programs can be found in many countries.
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compensation to victims, whilst Austria and Belgium have a structural compensation
fund.  These two solutions share many similarities, and the major distinction is whether
the compensation decision is made case by case, depending on each disaster’s damages.
Although the government in different jurisdictions provides generous ex post recovery
due to political considerations in practice,  the critics to and disadvantages of this ex
post government recovery are widely discussed. 
First, ex post government recovery provides negative ex ante incentives for prevention,
and result in a less-safe environment and higher death tolls.  Take, e.g. Hurricane
Katrina. On the one hand, various government authorities participated in the race to
provide recovery over $ 100 million ex post;  however, there was a lack of investment in
prevention and a lack of emergency planning prior to the disaster.  On the other hand, it
causes the charity hazard of victims, which induces the dilemma that more government
recovery may cause more disaster losses because people are less likely to take precaution
and prevention measures.  Helpless and uninsured victims are more vulnerable to
disasters and, therefore, require more ex post aid, which, in turn, makes the disaster more
salient and politicians more eager to stage a rescue.
Second, ex post government recovery is increasingly insufficient for the growing needs
and may not be fit for purpose, due to the pressure on aid budgets and the delay in the
disbursement.  Government funding is usually disbursed annually, which creates a
growing mismatch between needs and financing. Empirical research also found that
government aid flows are not always associated with victims’ needs.  
Third, political-driven recovery puts too much weight on the news-sensitive problems and
hence diverts resources away from humanitarian compensation.  For instance, an
empirical study shows a correlation between elections and realized ex post government
payment: “disasters occurring in election years attract more ex post funding relative to
disasters in other years”.  An oversupply of ex post recovery is nearly unavoidable since
it allocates large political rewards to politicians.  This obviously violates the equality
principle since victims who suffer disaster in the election year are luckier than victims of
disasters occurring in other years.
D Ex ante Insurance Mechanism for Victim Compensation
The previous section showed that ex post government compensation mechanisms dilute
residents’ prevention incentives and create the mentioned charity hazard. Conversely, an
ex ante insurance mechanism could provide positive incentives to victims for disaster
reduction. However, potential victims’ reliance on government prevents them from
purchasing insurance.  Just as Gollier has argued, ‘solidarity kills market insurance’.
An empirical research on crop insurance in the Netherlands has shown that due to
government disaster compensation, insureds’ incentive to purchase insurance would be
severely undermined.  
However, the role of insurance in compensating victims has been emphasized in recent
years. Take Belgium, e.g. which once provided compensation through a structured fund to
victims. Since 2003, Belgium has moved to a system of mandatory insurance,
substantially reducing the role of the compensation fund in compensating victims.
Following Belgium and France’s comprehensive disaster insurance in covering disaster
risks, there might be a transition moving from ex post government recovery to ex ante
insurance in the Europe.  There is no formal EU intervention as far as the compensation
for victims of disasters is concerned.  As a result, EU member states, in principle, decide
on their own how to organize a system of compensation for disaster victims. That explains
the wide variety that can be observed. However, the Belgian and French insurance system
has been praised by law and economics scholars, and promoted for a much wider scale;
whilst in other states, like the Netherlands, the lack of a comprehensive ex ante insurance
system is severely criticized.
I Ex ante Insurance verse Ex Post Government Recovery
1. Incentives for Disaster Risk Reduction
People reacting to financial incentives is one of the basic starting points of law and
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optimal mechanism is whether it is possible to provide positive incentives for disaster risk
reduction and adopt preventive measures. When exposing potential victims to the
financial consequences of disasters, that may affect their decisions to avoid risk and
losses. Compared to ex post government recovery, the major advantage of ex ante
insurance is that it could provide positive incentives for potential victims to invest in risk
reduction and preventive measures.  Although investing in disaster risk reduction is, in
principle, possible with all kinds of disasters, the possibilities for victims to reduce risk ex
ante may well vary according to time and place, as was indicated above. Especially in
developing countries where, e.g. a location choice in an area which is not prone to disaster
risk is often simply not an option. The payment of an insurance premium before the
disaster makes the insured aware of the vulnerability to the disaster. This has a positive
impact on their behaviour.  This rationale certainly applies to natural disasters in areas
that are particularly prone, e.g. to flooding or earthquakes. The situation may be different,
however, with disasters that are so grave that they occur once in a lifetime. In that
particular case, it may be more difficult to assume that those potential disasters could
shape the behaviour of individuals or governments. 
To the contrary, ex post government recovery fails to alert potential victims to the disaster
consequences, and may thus negatively affect their decision to invest in mitigation
measures. Moreover, in certain cases, due to certain public and institutional biases,
preventive measures may be higher than the costs (the costs invested in the prevention of
terror attacks may be higher than other death-causing risks such as car accidents or non-
efficient health services). 
Besides exposing potential victims to the financial consequences of disasters, it is equally
important to relate the victims’ financial contribution (in insurance: the premium) to the
extent to which the victim is exposed to risk. In other words, risk differentiation should be
applied.  The victims exposed to more risk should, therefore, pay a higher financial
contribution (higher premium) and vice versa. This differentiation of risk can positively
affect victims’ incentives for prevention. Ex ante insurance could execute such risk
differentiation before the disaster because the insured who are exposed to more risk have
to pay higher premiums. Insurance in that manner contributes to risk awareness.
Insurance solutions are preferred to undifferentiated lump sum payments to victims by
the government. The problem with lump sum government compensation is that, in
principle, individuals who posed no risk and those with high risk receive the same
payments.  In that way, government compensation negatively affects the incentives for
disaster risk reduction as well as for mitigation of damages. Since the capital of
government compensation generally comes from all taxpayers, it might further violate
distributional justice because the higher risk residents, such as those living in a flood-
prone area, may simply freeride on all the taxpayers.
2. Administrative Cost
The second benchmark is whether the compensation mechanism could be operated at the
lowest administrative cost. Ex post government recovery is sometimes regarded as the
‘catastrophic responses to catastrophic risk,’  due to its higher administrative cost
including, but not limited to, salaries and wages paid to programme administrators, claim
processors and auditors; costs related to develop claims and other forms for applying
compensation; fees on communication with public; etc.  Compared to government, ex
ante insurance is praised due to its advantages of lower administrative costs and higher
efficiency as a result of using competitive markets.  Therefore, ex post government
recovery should and could be substituted by cheaper ex ante insurance purchased before
the disaster. Against efficient management, there is, of course, a profit that insurance
companies anticipate to make as a result of covering individuals against the disaster risk.
Insurance purchasers are expected to finance that profit. To some extent, those profits
made by insurance companies could outweigh the higher administrative costs related to
ex post government compensation, although, generally, private insurance companies will
have better incentives for cost reduction than do governments.
II The Role of Insurance for Victim Compensation and Disaster Risk Reduction










This site makes use of cookies. Please click here for more information. Close
8/13/2021 Compensation for Victims of Disasters · European Journal of Law Reform · Eleven Journals
https://www.elevenjournals.com/tijdschrift/ejlr/2021/2/EJLR_1387-2370_2021_023_002_004 8/18
Some may argue against ex ante insurance due to the problem of moral hazard. Moral
hazard is the tendency of insureds from vulnerable areas to exercise less care to avoid
losses than they would if insurers did not cover the losses.  The statement that
insurance could control moral hazard seems counterintuitive. Indeed, in much of the
literature, insurance is seen as antithetical to risk reduction.  However, compared to the
government, insurance is better at controlling and reducing moral hazard through using
technical tools stealthily.  
These technical tools, which almost all insurers use to one degree or another to control
moral hazard, include risk-based pricing, contract design (e.g. limits, deductibles,
copayments and exclusions), loss prevention services, etc.  Risk-based pricing is just
the practice for the application of risk differentiation, since it offers lower premium to
insureds adopting mitigation measures and higher premium to riskier insureds.  A
deductible as a form of contract design could reduce moral hazard because it prevents
potential victims from shielding themselves entirely.  Insurers could provide loss-
prevention services due to their professional skills in risk management, such as
retrofitting of houses against windstorms to induce potential victims to avoid losses.  
In sum, through offering effective incentives, applying technical tools, and monitoring
policyholders’ behaviour, ex ante insurance has the capacity to control moral hazard of
insureds, promote policyholders’ cost-effective actions and thus work as an efficient
compensation mechanism.
2. Barriers to the Development of Disaster Insurance
First-party insurance has the potential to play a positive role in disaster victim
compensation, but it has done relatively little so far in practice.  Insurers even retreated
from underwriting catastrophic disasters and (partially) withdrew from such market.
Several barriers from both the supply side and the demand side prevent the development
of disaster risk policies. 
For the supply side, the barriers include increased losses of disasters, short-run profit
horizon of insurers and their directors and officers, and the insurability concern of
catastrophes.  As a result, insurers actually do not have strong incentives to provide
disaster coverage. 
For the demand side, many potential victims just do not purchase catastrophe insurance.
Behavioural economics explains consumers’ anomalies due to the intuitive thinking
bias  and myopic loss aversion.  Consumers just ignore such catastrophe risk because
they believe ‘it will not happen to me’.  This attitude makes consumers underestimate
the risks of being exposed in disasters and they will not purchase sufficient insurance
coverage voluntarily.  What is worse, counting on ex post government recovery
following disasters, as we discussed in Section C, many victims choose not to purchase
insurance, which is actually a rational choice rather than a bias.  In other words, the
insufficient demand for insurance may result from the ex post generosity of the
government.
E Public-Private Partnership for Victim Compensation
By discussing government-provided compensation mechanisms, we noticed a mixed role
of government intervention. On the one hand, during government relief corresponds, as
was shown above in Section C II, with principles of efficient compensation. On the other
hand, ex post government recovery provides, as shown in Section C III, negative
incentives for disaster risk reduction.  In Section D, it was concluded that ex ante
insurance can, on the one hand, provide incentives for disaster risk reduction. On the
other hand, disaster insurance may not emerge since insurers may be reluctant to provide
cover and individuals exposed to risk may not realize that their situation could be
improved through insurance. This justifies an intervention of the government to support
disaster insurance. Potential victims lack sufficient demand for insurance. For some
potential victims, it is the rational response since they count on ex post government
recovery.  For some victims, it is irrational since they may largely underestimate the
risk for low-probability losses.  
Therefore, a PPP, which could combine the merits of both government intervention and
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I Evaluating Different Approaches of PPP in Compensating Victims
Since there is no unified definition of PPP, this word has been used under different
circumstances and carries different meanings.  It has shifted from being a simple
technique adopted by the government to enhance infrastructure development towards
being a comprehensive policy preference at the heart of governance.  In the field of
disaster victim compensation, the attempts to develop PPPs generally can take three
different forms. 
Under the first approach, insurers provide disaster risk coverage and compensate victims
in the case of damages, whilst the government does not intervene in either direct
insurance or reinsurance. The task of the government in this first model is to take
administrative measures to facilitate and guarantee the independence of insurers’
operation, such as setting rules for buildings and land use and protecting the well-
functioning competitive market. The old English flood insurance programme, the one that
existed before the entry of the new Flood Re programme, in the United Kingdom, is a
typical example. The United Kingdom’s private flood insurance scheme demonstrates how
a large private insurance could work, and it was considered efficient.  Flood Re was
built on a gentleman’s agreement between the insurers and the government, whereby the
government agreed to invest substantially in preventive measures to reduce flood risks
and the insurers from their side agreed to provide cover. The challenge facing the United
Kingdom, however, was how to keep it widely available and affordable, specifically to
enable high-flood-risk households to obtain it at an affordable price, which is a main
concern of the new Flood Re programme.  In recent years, the programme has also
been challenged as the insurers considered that the government did not come up to its
part of the deal, i.e. too few investments would have been made in flood prevention.
Currently, the UK government has reformed building regulations, ensuring that residents
are required to take disaster resilience/resistance measures.  In this first model, the
cooperation is therefore relatively loose in the sense that it is the insurers that provide
cover; the government, from its side, promises to take either public measures to prevent
risks or to issue regulations aiming at disaster risk reduction. 
The second model seems to be the opposite of the first approach. In the second model, the
government is the primary risk bearer for disaster, whilst private insurers only play an
exclusively administrative role in running the programme.  This model has been
developed within the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) in the United States. The
NFIP was established according to the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, in order to
assume the flood risk and offer coverage for disaster prone area residents.  Private
insurers do not assume risks, but only administer policy coverage as the agent for FEMA.
Moreover, there is no reinsurance arrangement in the NFIP. If claims exceed its financial
capacity, the federal government provides bailout. This approach provides little advantage
over a pure government-provided compensation programme, since the private insurers
have no incentives to regulate policyholders’ behaviours and enhance the effectiveness of
the programme.  
The third model seems to stand in the middle of the above two approaches, where private
insurers underwrite the disaster risk like many other lines in the private market, whilst
the government acts as the last resort to provide additional capacity through reinsurance
or other kinds of financial guarantee. The French Caisse Centrale de Réassurance (CCR),
the U.S. federal-backed terrorism insurance and Turkish Catastrophe Insurance Pool are
models of this approach. Take the French CCR as an example: the insurers are responsible
for underwriting primary coverage, whilst the government provides subsidized
reinsurance with an unlimited guarantee and cooperates with private insurers to create
prevention and mitigation plans.  This enables primary insurers to underwrite disaster
insurance policies at affordable prices for homeowners.  This model is more promising
than the previous two, but is not perfect either. First, government-sponsored reinsurance
generally offers subsidized premiums, which partially reduces incentives for disaster risk
reduction.  Moreover, unlike private insurers, who face competitive pressure,
governments face political pressure and, therefore, often apply a weaker pricing model.
Again, the pricing may not sufficiently reflect risk and, therefore, not provide sufficient
incentives for disaster risk reduction.  This model also requires a mandatory
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II Outlook and Policy Recommendations for PPP
The starting point for any recommendation is that an ex post compensation mechanism
should always be structured in such a manner that it provides ex ante incentives for
disaster risk reduction. The system requires ‘the potential to transfer risk to the party
most able to bear it –that is, the party that can best manage it or mitigate it’.  These
starting points have two important consequences for the role of the government in
compensating victims of disaster.
1. Stick to During Government Relief
Most criticism on government-provided compensation efforts that we have examined
above refer to ex post government recovery, rather than to during government relief.
Undoubtedly, no one should object to the government providing emergency relief,
including medical treatment, food, shelter and direct payment to victims during and in
the aftermath of a disaster.  In addition, during government relief contributes to deal
with the affordability issue of low-income residents for financial compensation solutions.
It could “assist those who cannot afford to invest protective measures,…, against
catastrophic losses for risks that are considered uninsurable by the private sector
alone.”
2. Facilitate the Ex ante Insurance
In order to promote the role of ex ante insurance in compensating victims, the
government should facilitate to solve the supply-and-demand barriers. To solve the
supply barriers, the government could act as reinsurer to help fill the ‘capacity gap’ of
primary insurers in underwriting disasters. Government-sponsored reinsurance can
support failing insurance due to ‘a deep credit capacity’ of the government since it could
raise money effectively and quickly through tax or issuing debt or bonds after disasters.
To solve the demand barriers, the government should reduce and even eliminate ex post
government recovery and help solve the problem of adverse selection of potential victims
with the provision of mandatory rules (like France’s mandatory comprehensive disaster
insurance model ). Furthermore, the government should provide public goods, like
levees, and set rules and codes for disaster prevention to facilitate the insurance
operation. Last but not the least, the government should pay special treatment to low-
income residents. For example, it may provide means-tested vouchers which could cover
part of the cost of insurance, and mitigation grants and loans, to those poor residents to
afford insurance whilst keeping insurance premiums reflecting risk.
F Conclusion
Having started with a basic review of the evolution of disaster understanding and
fundamental principles of victim compensation, we outlined and compared the
government relief and recovery, insurance, PPPs in the framework of ex ante, during, and
ex post timeline, to explore what kind of compensation mechanism could provide optimal
incentives for disaster risk mitigation. By evaluating those mechanisms, we can observe
serious limits in government-provided ex post recovery, and challenges in exclusive ex
ante insurance. However, there is a remarkably dynamic partnership whereby
compensation mechanisms interact in different stages of disaster management. Several
recommendations are proposed on how a comprehensive PPP could be established. 
There are examples of legal systems that have already introduced the models we propose.
In the EU, although compensation for disaster victims is often used as a political tool,
European member states increasingly adopt a PPP mechanism whereby private insurance
coverage is backed up with government-sponsored reinsurance. In China, the state still
sticks to the praised during government relief, and, it gradually reduces the ex post
government recovery by introducing ex ante insurance. Moreover, in the United States,
especially after Hurricane Katrina, more suggestions are proposed to implement a PPP
reform of the NIFP where primary insurers are responsible for underwriting flood risks
and some type of federal reinsurance should be provided.  Our analysis and
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effective compensation for disaster victims which equally contributes to disaster risk
reduction.
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